Since the abolition of chattel slavery, the progress of human rights in America has been peculiarly attached to the traffic in commodities. Guarantees of rights considered universal in nature, as belonging to all humanity, bear a trademark of commerce. As a consequence, the rules of the market economy have come to penetrate ever more deeply into social existence, and the distinction between persons and things has eroded-a distinction at the heart of the difference between slavery and freedom. 
Put bluntly, I argue that the Commerce Clause has become a charter of human rights where the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment ends. 3 Particularly, it is wrongs of sex that have connected human rights to commodity conceptions of personhood rather than calling forth antislavery prohibitions. For a century, Congress has invoked the commerce power in legislating against women's subjection-from the ban on white slave trafficking to the ban on violence against women-making the flow of trade a source of protection against violations of free will and invasions of the body. 4 As justified by the rules of commerce, human rights doctrine has carried the ethos of the market into the most private recesses of social exchange.
The development of this commerce-laden rights tradition involves deep contradictions: On the one hand, treating human beings as commodities-at its most extreme-counts as slavery. On the other hand, yoking fundamental rights to the commerce power adds new moral legitimacy to economic values, though on behalf of human dignity.
Paradoxically, guarantees of human rights have come to underwrite the sway of the market. This is a puzzle unstudied in jeremiads on the market's dominion. Today philosophers argue that market values have overreached their moral limits, observing that the "logic of buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone but increasingly governs the whole of life." 5 The warning echoes classic historical critiques of market society. Quoting Aristotle's Politics, the political economist Karl Polanyi lamented a world that had been lost-where markets had been "mere accessories" to household economy-and condemned the destruction of "organic forms of existence." 6 Such claims take no account of human rights that owe their guarantee to market relations. Yet a century and a half ago, at the end of the Civil War, appeals for universal freedom as an outcome of slave emancipation anticipated the predicaments of sex. There were "no new arguments to be made on human rights," explained Elizabeth Cady Stanton to the American Equal Rights Association, except to "teach man that woman is not an anomalous being." 7 By outlawing wrongs of sex as burdens on commerce, Congress has at once guaranteed rights and extended the logic of buying and selling. 8 In other words, the creation of this rights tradition enshrines a limitless market but also establishes the emancipatory sovereignty of the nation-state founded on the flow of commerce. Precisely because the situation of women remains anomalous, Congress has acted under the commerce power rather than the antislavery amendment. My account of the making of this human rights tradition begins with the contemporary problem of hate violence, which sets in relief the counterpoint between the Thirteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Next it turns back to the era of slave emancipation, and then proceeds by following the paths of congressional lawmaking and constitutional jurisprudence, while also looking outward to international treaties that have shaped American guarantees of rights.
Although this is a distinctly American story, it may well prompt broader reflection on cosmopolitan political authority, global capitalism, and protection against both states and The Hate Crimes Act reaches into a private sphere once fenced off from national authority. The Reconstruction Amendments were designed to empower Congress to enforce the abolition of slavery and its vestiges, and to guarantee rights of national citizenship, suffrage, due process, and equal protection of the law. Yet sex-based crimes-if not carried out across state lines or involving state action-remained within the traditional police power of the states. To the states was reserved authority for protecting the right to bodily security long defined as essential to liberty. A hate crimes law of 1968, enacted by Congress after the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., addressed race, color, religion, and national origin alone, and covered only federally protected activities: suffrage, jury service, employment, interstate travel, pursuit of public education, enrollment in government programs, and use of public accommodations. The new measure, sponsored by John Conyers and Edward Kennedy, proceeds further. It grants all persons, in all places, a right to freedom from hate violence. 12 The expansive hate crimes enactment rests on two constitutional pillars, each supporting the power of Congress to overcome states' rights doctrine. The prohibition of violence animated by hate due to race, color, religion, or national origin rests on the Thirteenth Amendment. But the prohibition of violence animated by hate due to gender, sexuality, or disability rests on the Commerce Clause. Bias alone is a sufficient warrant for congressional action against hate crime under the antislavery amendment. 13 But bias must affect buying and selling-the flow of commodities across state borders-for Congress to ban hate violence motivated by sex under the commerce power. 14 The language of the statute is nothing if not explicit. Where the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply-to violence based on sex-the commerce power operates.
The legislative findings that introduce the act highlight the intersection of violence, slavery, and race that empowers Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment to trespass on state authority in legislating against hate crime in order to purge the nation of the vestiges of chattel bondage:
For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude were defined by the race, color, and ancestry of those held in bondage. Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race, color, or ancestry. . . . Accordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude. 15 Notably absent from the findings is the designation of wrongs of sex as a badge of slavery and involuntary servitude that falls within the sphere of congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amendment. Notably absent, too, is any claim about a racial hate crime affecting the stream of interstate commerce.
By contrast, the statute highlights the intersection of the market, sex, and violence that empowers Congress to reach hate crimes under the Commerce Clause. Describing the nature of offenses bearing on sex, the language of the act grows specific and detailed, not simply about bodily injury and the use of dangerous weapons, firearms, and incendiary devices but also about the channels, facilities, and instrumentalities of commerce, and about crimes that interfere with "economic activity" and "purchasing goods and services" and "sustaining employment" and "commercial activity"-about violence that "affects interstate or foreign commerce." Such violence must involve some kind of "Circumstances" demonstrating a market nexus and/or the circulation of people or things among states or nations: Notably absent from the explanation of circumstantial evidence of economic activity is violence involving slavery's badges. Notably absent, too, is any assumption that market exchange stands apart from the private sphere.
Under the Hate Crimes Act, therefore, where the relics of bondage prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment are not at issue-in violence due to sex-the commerce nexus entitles Congress to safeguard freedom from bodily injury. By definition, the market's ways must pervade social life traditionally belonging to the sphere of domestic relations governed by the states to create the authority of the nation to prohibit hate violence.
So the attorney general of the United States testified in congressional hearings, endorsing the measure's constitutionality on the eve of its passage. Violent acts motivated by bias, Eric Holder told the Senate Judiciary Committee, "deny the humanity that we all share."
Thirteenth Amendment
Congress has authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to punish racially motivated violence as part of a reasonable legislative effort to extinguish the relics, badges, and incidents of slavery. . . .
Commerce Clause Jurisdiction
The In the eyes of the law, unfree sex could not exist within marriage as a bond founded on contract and consent. The intercourse between husband and wife represented the antithesis of slave breeding, for the illusion of perpetual consent turned violence into a legitimate taking. A woman could not be ravished by her own husband, just as a slave master could never be guilty of raping his chattel property: the essential difference was wives were assumed always to be willing, but slaves to have no will of their own. 29 In the era of slave emancipation, therefore, wrongs of sex fell beyond the limits of In re White-Slave Trade, a legislative memorandum prepared by the commerce committee of the House of Representatives in 1909, set forth the approach of Congress. In explaining the measure's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, the memorandum advanced three main claims. First, a prostitute transported "unwillingly" was the legal equivalent of an inanimate commodity, with both representing "the subject of commerce."
Second, the traffic in women "directly connected" to the flow of interstate commerce.
Third, because the trade was at once "national in its character" and a peril to "civilized nations" the assertion of federal authority would not infringe on state police power.
Therefore, the commerce power afforded Congress ample authority to prohibit sex trafficking. 36 Particularly, In re White-Slave Trade dwelled on the parity between persons and property, and on the opposition between consent and coercion. It began with the principle that commerce encompasses the conveyance of passengers, further positing that the power of Congress over "the transportation of property of course applies to the transportation of persons." It stressed that white slaves suffered "sale and exploitation" and "force and restraint," that they were objects of sexual commerce "against their will," that they were made to be "literally slaves . . . women owned and held as property." They were utterly unlike willing wives. Accordingly, the commerce power extended to their circulation, like merchandise-articles with exchange value but without volition. 37 Oratory in Congress decried illegitimate wealth creation, filthy lucre begotten by unfree sex. That it was an evil practice to "make merchandise of a human soul" had become By such reasoning, not even an impure woman amounted to a piece of merchandise, "a commodity subject to interstate commerce." 40 Put simply, the point was that some intercourse did not constitute commerce.
Furthermore, it was asked why women should not be held culpable for their own transit, along with the traffickers who purchased their tickets, since even a white slave was not a thing-like cotton or cattle-with "no volition." If Congress aimed to "purify commerce,"
impartial justice required punishing an interstate prostitute as a person possessing a will of her own and containing no "inherent quality" rendering her equivalent to diseased, guiltless livestock. 41 The counterargument hardly resolved the perplexities of the legislation-of delivering freedom by equating women with articles of commerce. Perversely, the justification for the act deplored the merchandising of souls but ratified the dominion of As Justice Holmes wrote, "We abandon the illusion that the woman always is the victim." 43 In the law's eyes, a white slave could be both the unfree object and willing agent of unlawful sexual commerce. promoting universal respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 45 The United Nations declaration against violence speaks of "human rights" and the "fundamental freedoms of women" and "historically unequal power relations between men and women" and the "dignity of all human beings." It enjoins all nations to condemn and eliminate and punish gender-based violence, which it defines in terms of deprivation of liberty and physical, sexual, and psychological harm, "occurring in public or in private life."
It states that violence encompasses not only sexual trafficking, coercion, and brutality within the "general community," but also intimacies at home and within the precincts of marriage, in particular the wrong of marital rape. According to the United Nations, all violence against women violates human rights. 46 In contrast, the American act speaks of "crossing a state line," not of human rights.
Like the United Nations declaration, it extends beyond the public sphere into private life. Under the Violence Against Women Act, therefore, the sweeping commerce power became an instrument of liberation, which reached into the home. It pierced into a private sphere of social exchange left untouched by the Thirteenth Amendment. "The Commerce
Originally, it was titled
Clause is a broad grant of power allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on interstate commerce," stated the Senate Judiciary Committee. 52 But that expansive national power had never before been invoked to intrude on household bonds by connecting wellbeing with interstate commerce.
Congress designed the act expressly to safeguard freedom from sexual brutality as a fundamental right of personhood, and the guarantee drew no distinction between violence done by a stranger and a one-time lover. According to the rights clause, "All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." For the first time, every woman would be entitled to enforce that right, rather than depending on police and prosecutors. An unwilling wife would acquire a right to sue her husband for rape, even in states that still adhered to the rule that rape was ravishing a woman without the consent assumed in marriage-a majority when the act was passed. Her status would be nothing like that of a white slave punishable for trafficking herself. The Court reined in the commerce power and also denied that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to private wrongs, revoking the right of women to seek justice, at their own will.
With Morrison, the anti-violence act became a negative landmark in the path of the law connecting human rights to market exchange.
The Court spoke categorically: violent crime against women was not "economic in nature"-"not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity"-and fell outside the authority afforded by the commerce power. 64 The causal connection between violence due to sex and the flow of commerce was too indirect. Arguments on behalf of human rights were just as unconvincing to the Court.
Uselessly, amicus briefs spoke of "binding commitments under international law" and "violations of international human rights." Admonitions that it was improper to "read the Commerce Clause to invalidate an Act of Congress that advances our treaty and customary international commitments" came to nothing. 68 Dissociating the exchange of goods and the rights of persons by defining subjection due to sex as "noneconomic," Morrison not only limited congressional authority to remedy private wrongs but refused the fulfillment of global human rights agreements. The dissent lamented the "ebb of the commerce power." 69 The constitutional question, then, appeared settled. Enabling a woman to enforce her right to freedom from sex-based violence fell beyond the sphere of national sovereignty that is grounded in commodity exchange. As once Congress had insisted on the difference between a wife and a freed slave, so the Court now insisted on the boundary between domestic bonds and the flow of commerce.
came down from the Court in Morrison, making it appear that a ban on hate violence extending to sex and home life would be a dead letter. 70 With the delimiting of the commerce power, the theory was no longer that Congress was entitled to regulate private life simply because the wrongs at stake affected the flow of interstate commerce, however remote the intercourse from the market itself. New objections emerged after Morrison: that committing hate crimes "is in no sense economic or commercial but instead is noneconomic and criminal in nature" and that a congressional prohibition would be "struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of the Constitution." There were more warnings about a flood of rape cases entering the federal courts, although the hate crimes measure contained no self-enforcing rights guarantee, only criminal sanctions. 71 Therefore the act was rewritten, and the commerce nexus spelled out more distinctly in the section on hate crimes based on sex. Congress shored up its authority by requiring direct circumstantial proof that the forbidden activity was both economic in nature and crossed state lines, rather than relying on the concept of aggregate effect. It added a jurisdictional element absent from the defunct rights clause of the Violence Against Women Act.
The dualism of the hate crimes act thus grew more explicit-the juxtaposition of the commerce-saturated section on sex with the antislavery-infused section on race. It is an inventory of the market's expanse that does not accompany the description of hate crimes based on race. For there, owing to the act's cleft structure, the badges of slavery do the work of commodity relations, and the Thirteenth Amendment stands in place of the Commerce Clause. But hate crimes based on sex must connect directly to the flow of interstate commerce to constitute intercourse subject to the power of the nation-state. An article of merchandise-use of a weapon that had crossed state borders-would transform even a rape at home into violence sufficiently economic in nature for Congress to forbid it.
In the market's reach into private life lay the necessary justification for both the authority of the national government and the protection of persons.
The Hate Crimes Act has been upheld under both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, as courts have approved the congressional interpretation of the badges of slavery and weighed the circumstantial evidence of an interstate commerce nexus.
It was a reasonable conclusion "that physically attacking a person of a particular race . . . is a badge or incident of slavery," held the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, while stressing that the ban on "non-racial" hate violence emanated from the commerce power, for otherwise "nearly every hurtful thing . . . might be analogized to slavery." And it was the channel of a highway and instrumentality of a car-as proof of a commerce nexus-that led a United States District Court in Kentucky to uphold the act in a case involving hate violence directed at a gay man. Although denying that the flow of commerce should be treated as "talismanic," the ruling spoke of the "interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods move" and the "quintessential instrumentalities of modern interstate commerce" in finding private "non-economic activity" punishable by the national government. As the court observed, "the Interstate Commerce Clause continues to cast a very large shadow, indeed." 74 No hate crimes case has reached the Supreme Court, however; nor has a ruling on hate violence at home come from any court. 75 As a constitutional question, the breadth of the commerce power has scarcely been settled. And the paradox is most acute where the wrongs of women are at stake. Sex has been potent in rendering human rights a commodity fiction. 
